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This intervention attempts to trace and to give answers to the special issue of 
whether the use of the methods of the medically assisted reproduction could be 
considered legally and ethically permissible for the (unmarried)1 single man. The 
basis of this position is the argument of equality, since the same is legislatively2 
allowed for the single woman. 
This issue came out from the judgment No 2827/2008 of the Athens Single 
Member Court of First Instance. In this judgment the court ruled that  
 
since the right to artificial reproduction is established in Article 5 paragraph 1 of 
the Constitution . . . . then the stance of Law 3086/2002 is problematic from the 
point of view of Article 4 of the Constitution, because the granting of the right 
of artificial reproduction to the single woman and at the same moment the single 
man’s deprivation of the right, . . . . is a fragrant discriminatory treatment of 
those interested in the solution of artificial reproduction which is not justified by 
articles 4 paragraph 3, 4 paragraph 2 of the Constitution3.  
 
                                                          
1 Hereinafter, we will use only the term “single man” without the additional adjectival specification 
“unmarried”, because it is considered as an unnecessary redundancy. The crucial element of the topic 
under discussion is not the existence of a marriage but the fact that the man who desires to have a child 
through the methods of the medically assisted reproduction is single, i.e. he does not have a stable 
relationship with a person of the opposite sex. Besides, in the case of a married man who wants to have 
a child through the use of such methods, while his wife is still alive, I believe that the answer is, at least 
up until now, catholically negative and it would very hardly change; in any case this issue will not be 
addressed in this study. In relation now to the case of a man who is a widow and wants to have a child 
through post mortem fertilization, this is a separate issue and it is the object of analysis of another 
study. 
2 Law 3089/2002 – Article 1456 of the Civil Code. 
3 The reference to Article 4 paragraph 3 of the Constitution is probably an inadvertent error of the 
judicial decision, since this particular constitutional provision does not have any relevance to this case. 
On the contrary, the reference to Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Constitution is necessary.  
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This judgment was followed by judgment No 13707/2009 of the Thessaloniki Single 
Member Court of First Instance4. 
 With these decisions the issue of the single man’s access to the medicially 
assisted reproduction came at the forefront of the theoretical discussion. This issue is 
analyzed in the following pages under the prism of the argument of equality between 
men and women. 
 
The issue of equality 
 
The argument 
Initially, in relation to the issue of equality, we have to examine whether the 
different treatment between the single woman and the single man is arbitrary and 
whether it is not founded in any objective reason, which could justify the 
differentiated treatment. If such an objective and substantial reason exists, then the 
issue of discriminative treatment cannot be raised. 
The advocates of the position that these are essentially different cases focus on 
the fact of biological reality. As a consequence of his nature and biological 
construction, a man cannot perceive a child5. And if the replenishment of a medical 
necessity with the methods of medically assisted reproduction seems to be plausible 
for many, it cannot be accepted that this replenishment goes against the nature’s rules. 
The inexistence of uterus and of the absence of the possibility of gestation cannot be 
considered as α man’s medical necessity, because nature has not granted such a 
possibility to him. On the contrary, in the case of the woman, since the ability of 
gestation is part of her nature, this ability can be replenished via the methods of 
medically assisted reproduction, when there is medical necessity6.  
                                                          
4 It is should be noted that the judgment No 28274/2008 of the Athens Single Member Court of First 
Instance was appealed by the Public Prosecutor of a First Instance Court and the judgment No 
3357/2010 of the Athens Court of Appeal accepted the Public Prosecutor’s appeal, repealed the 
appealed decision, tried the case on merits, and dismissed the single man’s petition.  
5 Th. K. Papachristou, Paratirisis sti 2827/2008 MPR Ath [Observations to the Judgment No 2827/2008 
of the Athens Single Member Court of First Instance], CHRONIKA IDIOTIKOU DIKAIOU [CHRID] 818 
(2009) (Greece) (however, the same author mentions that in the past he had supported and an opposite 
opinion: Thanasis K. Papachristou, TECHNITI ANAPARAGOGI KE ASTIKO DIKAIO [ARTIFICIAL 
REPRODUCTION AND CIVIL LAW] 55 (2003) (Greece). 
6 Athens Court of Appeal, Judgment No 3357/2010, T. Vidalis, To protagma tis ikogenias [Family as a 
prefix], NOMIKO VIMA [NOB] 832 (2003) (Greece), G. Koumantos, To ikogeniako dikaio os simeio 
anametrisis [Family law as a point of confrontation], DIGESTA 123 (2005) (Greece), Fountedaki, supra, 
at 178, P. Nikolopoulos, Scholio sti 2827/2008 MPR Ath [Comment on Athens Single Member Court 
of First Instance, Judgment No 2827/2008], NOMIKO VIMA [NOB] 1440 (2012) (Greece). 
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The counterargument 
 
The opposite side is projecting the argument that the cases are identical and 
that we cannot use physiology as excuse, because then neither a woman alone is able 
to conceive a child nor a man7. Therefore, since it is accepted that the single woman 
can use the methods of medically assisted reproduction, for which the donor’s sperm 
(which is something that she does not have) is necessary, then the single man should 
also be allowed to use the same methods in order to replenish the missing elements8 of 
the female overies and uterus9. 
 
The thesis 
 This intervention adopts the position that the first opinion should be 
considered as more accurate with the following additions to its foundational 
syllogism: according to the prevailing opinion, the genetic material (sperm and ovum) 
is legally considered as “res”. On the contrary, the uterus is an organ of the woman’s 
body and, since it remains integrally connected with her body, it is part of her whole 
organism. 
The first intermediate conclusion that we can draw from this finding is that the 
use of the genetical material of the opposite sex should be distinguished from the use 
of the uterus, because the latter is equated to the «use» of another person. This fact 
violates the foundamental constititutional principle of the value of the human being 
(Article 2 paragraph 1 of the Constitution), which prohibits the treatment of a human 
being (= physical being – bodily functions) as a “res” or as a means for the attainment 
of whatever purpose10, even if the human being consents to this11. 
                                                          
7 T.Vidalis, VIODIKIAO – TO PROSOPO [BIOLAW – THE PERSON] 212 (2007) (Greece), Nikos Koumoutzis, 
He techniti anaparagogi tou agamou monou andra [The artificial reproduction of the single man], 
CHRONIKA IDIOTIKOU DIKAIOU [CHRID] 316 (2011) (Greece). 
8 E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki, He iatrika ipovoithoumeni anaparagogi. To dikaioma tou agamou ke 
monachikou andra na apoktisi paidi me ti voitheia parenthetis miteras [The medically assisted 
reproduction. The right of the single man to have a child with the assistance of a surrogate mother], 
http:// www.medlaw-bioethics.gr/material/teuxos9.pdf, N. Koumoutzis, He anatropi tis dikastikis adias 
gia tin techniti anaparagogi [The reversal of the judicial permit for the artificial reproduction], 
CHRONIKA IDIOTIKOU DIKAIOU [CHRID] 552 (2013) (Greece). 
9 Always under the necessary condition that in the face of the applicant there is a medical necessity 
which makes impossible the natural reproduction. 
10 Chryssogonos, supra, at 109. 
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In the case of the single women, and only if medical necessity exists, they are 
allowed to use this particular scientific method in order to replenish an ability that 
they would otherwise have. However, it does not seem to exist a similar pursuasive 
reasoning, which could justify the allowance of the «use» by the single men of 
another woman and of the functions of her organism, because the men’s organism 
would never be in a position to perform similar functions, even if there was not any 
medical necessity.  
Thus, the exclusion by the legislator of such a possibility is fully justified on 
the basis of the foundational reasoning of the relevant legislation on the medical 
assistance to the human reproduction and of the foundational reasoning of the more 
general constitutional principles12. More specifically, the medically assisted 
reproduction is permitted only in cases of medical illenesses which do not allow the 
physical functioning of the human reproductive system and its ability to fulfil the 
constitutionally founded right to reproduction and to offspring acquisition. Since the 
methods of the medically assisted reproduction are permitted only for these reasons, 
they cannot become accepted for the transgression of the abilities that nature offers to 
man and woman. And since, as a consequence of their biological construction, man 
and woman differ in the fact that only the woman has the gestation ability, only to her 
is permitted to substitute her uterus with the assistance of another woman13. 
In conclusion, it is evident, I think, that these situations are not substantially 
identical and, therefore, their differentiated treatment is not only sound but also 
imperative. 
 
Is the scientifically plausible morally acceptable, too? 
Last but not least, we should raise more as an issue for thought rather than an 
argument, the moral stance of such a recognition and its acceptance from the society. 
Additionally, emphasis should be also placed on the psycological consequences that 
such a recognition will have on the child that will be born from the desire of a single 
                                                                                                                                                                      
11 In its totality, the abovementioned position could be the basis for the serious contestation of the 
legality of the medical assisted reproduction with the method of surrogate uterus in general, even for 
the single women. Nevertheless, this argument is conversely used in Kounougeri-Manoledaki, supra. 
12 D. Papadopoulou –Klamari, HE SUGGENIA [THE KINSHIP] 223 (2010) (Greece). 
13 Athens Court of Appeal, Judgment No 3357/2010, Papadopoulou –Klamari, supra, at 223, P. 
Nikopoulos, supra, at 1440. 
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man and that will be gestated by a woman who is not intended to have any substantive 
relationship with this child after his or her birth14. 
Beginning with this last point, we should mention that the appearance of new 
scientific possibilities and the creation of alternative family schemes arose very 
recently and they «have gone» only a very short distance15. Therefore, it seems that it 
is not possible to draw reliable and sufficient consclusions in relation to the 
consequences that they can have on the psychical health and balance of a child who 
grows only with his father, because that was his or her father’s choice16.  
Furthermore, the social acceptance of such phenomena has not been measured 
yet17; Nevertheless, it can be derived that the legislator decided to intentionally leave 
them outside of the currently existing legal framework, because when these laws were 
voted, just few years ago, the legislator’s belief was that they lay beyond the good 
usages and the necessary social consensus. 
Of course, there are many times when the legislator has to be pioneer, radical, 
and progressive. However, the legislator is not allowed not to take into consideration 
the various social messages and the social factums. Let alone, it seems that the judge 
is not legitimized to create through the case law a sitution a case which is differently 
regulated by the legislation. 
On the other hand, it has to be evaluated, at a de lege ferenda level, whether 
there is a sufficient and serious reason to justify the single man’s deprivation by the 
                                                          
14 I. Petrou, He anthropini eleftheria ke ta kinonikoithika zitimata ton aparchon tis zois tou anthropou 
[The human freedom and the socio-ethical issues of the beginning of human life], in SYNEDRIO PROS 
TIMIN TIS KATHIGITRIAS E. KOUNOUGERI-MANOLEDAKI, IATRIKI HYPOVOITHIS STIN ANTHROPININ 
ANAPARAGOGI. 10 CHRONIA EFARMOGIS TOU NOMOU 3089/2002 [CONFERENCE IN HONOR OF 
PROFESSOR E. KOUNOUGERI-MANOLEDAKI, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE HUMAN REPRODUCTION. 10 
YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW 3089/2002] 21 (2013) (Greece), Th. Trokanas, supra, at 205. 
15 See characteristically the estimations in the preface of Spiridakis, supra, at 2, see also E. 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Epanaprosdiorizontas tin ennoia tis oikogenias se anthropini anaparagogi 
[Redetermination of the notion of family in human reproduction], in SYNEDRIO PROS TIMIN TIS 
KATHIGITRIAS E. KOUNOUGERI-MANOLEDAKI, IATRIKI HYPOVOITHIS STIN ANTHROPININ ANAPARAGOGI. 
10 CHRONIA EFARMOGIS TOU NOMOU 3089/2002 [CONFERENCE IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR E. 
KOUNOUGERI-MANOLEDAKI, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE HUMAN REPRODUCTION. 10 YEARS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW 3089/2002] 35 (2013) (Greece). 
16 See also Velli, supra, at 495, G. Daskaroli, Paratiriseis epita apo to nomo peri hypovoithoumenis 
anaparagogis [Observarions after the Law for assisted reproduction], CHRONIKA IDIOTIKOU DIKAIOU 
[CHRID] 193 (2004) (Greece). See also for this same issue in relation to the single women: A. 
KOTZAMPASI, DIKAIOMA STI MITROTITA KE TECHNITI GONIMOPOIISI: ENA POLITICO ZITIMA [RIGHT TO 
MOTHERHOOD AND ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZATION: A POLITICAL ISSUE] 21 (2003) (Greece). 
17 See also Velli, supra, at 495, where references and statistics from other European countries are 
provided (see esp page 497). 
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law and the society of the possibility to have a child, when at the same time such an 
option is recognized for the single woman18. 
If we accept the position that at this moment there is not a single man’s right 
to have access to the methods of the medically assisted reproduction, since the 
purpose of this kind of reproduction is to heal a medical necessity, then at a next 
stage, we have to evaluate whether there is any sufficient and serious de lege ferenda-
moral reason that could justify the single man’s deprivation of the possibility to have 
a child, while such an opportunity is recognized for the single woman19. Otherwise, 
such a right of the single man to have access to the technological facilities of the 
medically assisted reproduction could be established. However, that would obviously 
be a right not connected with any medical necessity. 
It can be easily understood that the basis of such a discussion cannot be 
equality. The questions that arise are even tougher: 
Under which conditions such a single man’s right could be introduced if it led 
to the establishment of a new family scheme? 
Is the man’s personal right to develop his personality through the acquisition 
of a child and through the creation of a family contradictory to the child’s interest to 
have a child? 
Are there any substantial and crucial interests, principles, and values of the 
legal order that are being disturbed, violated, or jeopardized? 
Lastly, should the legal order integrate and recognize everything that is 
scientifically feasible? 
 
Conclusion 
 
 According to the current-existing legislative framework, for the reasons that 
have been already explained, it seems that the recognition of the signle man’s right to 
the artificial reproduction with the use of a surrogate mother is feasible only with very 
shaky interpretive constructions and with transgressions of questionable correctness of 
the legislator’s choices.    
 Apart from this, there are serious doubts about whether such a possibility 
would be in favor of the interests of the child that will be born, or about whether this 
                                                          
18 Kounougeri-Manoledaki, supra note 8. 
19 Kounougeri-Manoledaki, supra note 8. 
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is just a case of the simple fulfillment of a man’s atomistic fantasies and selfish 
pursuits. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent there is social acceptance and 
consensus for the legitimization of such a practice, while the moral dilemmas are 
intensively posed, too. 
 The balancing is not an easy task. It should take into account not only the 
personal right to reproduction and a person’s individual desire, but also the interest of 
the child that is going to be born and the side-effect social consequences of such a 
choice. Furthermore, it also requires an integrated vision of all the parameters, the 
avoidance of obsessions and stereotypes and a dispassionate and rational assessment 
of the consequences that any possible choice could have, not only for the interests of 
the involved parts, but also for the society as a whole and for the functioning of the 
legal order.  
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